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Setting UK standards on the concept of
control: an analysis of lobbying behaviour
Renata Stenka and Peter Taylor*
Abstract — The present study aims to contribute to an understanding of the complexity of lobbying activities within the
accounting standard-setting process in the UK. The paper reports detailed content analysis of submission letters to four
related exposure drafts. These preceded two accounting standards that set out the concept of control used to determine the
scope of consolidation in the UK, except for reporting under international standards. Regulation on the concept of control
provides rich patterns of lobbying behaviour due to its controversial nature and its significance to financial reporting. Our
examination is conducted by dividing lobbyists into two categories, corporate and non-corporate, which are hypothesised
(and demonstrated) to lobby differently. In order to test the significance of these differences we apply ANOVA techniques
and univariate regression analysis. Corporate respondents are found to devote more attention to issues of specific
applicability of the concept of control, whereas non-corporate respondents tend to devote more attention to issues of general
applicability of this concept. A strong association between the issues raised by corporate respondents and their line of
business is revealed. Both categories of lobbyists are found to advance conceptually-based arguments more often than
economic consequences-based or combined arguments. However, when economic consequences-based arguments are used,
they come exclusively from the corporate category of respondents.
Keywords: consolidated financial statements; accounting standards; lobbying
1. Introduction
The lobbying behaviour of participants in the
accounting standard-setting process can be complex
(Sutton, 1984; Young, 1994; Georgiou, 2004; Kwok
and Sharp, 2005; Masocha and Weetman, 2007).
This paper seeks to contribute to understanding of
this complexity. It examines empirically lobbying
activities on four related exposure drafts (EDs).
These drafts preceded two UK accounting stand-
ards, namely FRS 2 Accounting for Subsidiary
Undertakings (ASB, 1992) and FRS 5 Reporting
the Substance of Transactions (ASB, 1994), that
regulate the concept of control used to determine the
scope of consolidation in the UK, except for
reporting under international accounting standards.1
We expect that the concept of control would
initiate rich patterns of lobbying behaviour due to its
controversial nature and its importance to financial
reporting. The scope of consolidation is central to
corporate reporting, as significant business activities
have increasingly come to be conducted by group
structures rather than single entities (Wooldridge,
1981, 1991; Nobes, 1987, 1993; Flower, 2004). As
consolidation became the dominant method for
preparing group financial statements, so the concept
of control determining the scope of consolidation
proved to be one of the most challenging conceptual
and technical issues for accounting regulators
(Nobes, 1987, 1993; Flower, 2004). Regulations
determining the composition of the group have the
potential to instigate a range of economic conse-
quences through their implications for contracting
relationships (e.g. debt covenants) and through other
economic mechanisms (Moonitz, 1978; Peasnell
and Yaansah, 1988; Mian and Smith, 1990a;
Paterson, 1993; Nobes, 1993; Flower, 2004).
Likely effects arise due to impacts on accounting
numbers reported on the balance sheet and financial
relationships existing off-balance sheet (and associ-
ated measurements of gearing, risk, and debt
capacity) as well as within the income statement
(with associated impacts on measured performance
and financial ratios of efficiency and profitability)
(Peasnell and Yaansah, 1988; Paterson, 1993;
Flower, 2004). It is not surprising therefore that
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the concept of control as a determinant of the scope
of consolidation has been at the centre of much
controversy in the evolution of the UK generally
accepted accounting principles (GAAP) (Bircher,
1988; Nobes, 1987, 1993; Rutherford, 2007: 258–
264). The public and regulatory debate, with its
practical and theoretical disputes, has been widely
reported, for example by Nobes (1987, 1990, 1993),
Ebling (1989), Pimm (1990), and Rutherford (2007:
258–264). A discussion of the UK setting at the time
the EDs were released is presented in the regulatory
background section of the paper. Controversy on the
control concept continues within the international
regulatory arena (Ketz, 2003; Flower, 2004;
Camfferman and Zeff, 2006; Hoogendoorn, 2006).
At the time of writing, the IASB had two projects in
train that related to this concept.2
Analysis of the four EDs that led to FRS 2 and
FRS 5 is conducted by dividing respondents to the
exposure drafts into two broad categories, corporate
and non-corporate, in order to reveal differences in
the pattern of their lobbying behaviour. This
division is based on the proposition that corporate
and non-corporate lobbyists demonstrate different
modes of rationality with regard to accounting
issues and therefore will lobby differently. Detailed
discussion of the lobbyists’ taxonomy is included in
the hypotheses development section of the paper.
The following research questions are addressed by
this study.
1. Do the issues3 addressed by corporate lobby-
ists in relation to proposals to regulate the
concept of control differ in nature from those
addressed by non-corporate lobbyists?
2. Do the arguments used by corporate lobbyists
in relation to proposals to regulate the concept
of control differ from those used by non-
corporate lobbyists?
The literature on lobbying is both varied and
extensive and includes a number of different
approaches and perspectives. There is a widespread
recognition that lobbying in the form of submission
letters provides respondents with a means of
influence and persuasion (Sutton, 1984; Booth and
Cocks, 1990; Young, 1994, 2003; MacDonald and
Richardson, 2004). Comment letters submitted in
response to exposure drafts or discussion papers on
proposed accounting standards frequently exhibit
complexity and richness in their content and a
number of researchers have conducted comprehen-
sive analyses of them (e.g. Hope and Briggs, 1982;
Hope and Gray, 1982; Nobes, 1992; Tutticci et al.,
1994; Weetman et al., 1996; Jupe, 2000; Weetman,
2001; Hill et al., 2002). The present paper seeks to
complement these studies. A contribution of the
paper lies in its focus on systematic differences in
lobbing behaviour between different categories of
respondents. We report detailed comparative analy-
sis of the lobbying behaviour of corporate and non-
corporate lobbyists that are hypothesised (and
demonstrated) to lobby differently. Thus, the
study’s premise is that it is important to understand
the differences in the pattern of lobbying activities
between different categories of respondents. Our
approach builds on other research whose focus, in
contrast, has been on single groups of respondents,
usually corporate lobbyists (Ndubizu et al., 1993;
Larson, 1997; Ang et al., 2000; Hill et al., 2002).
Reviewing the literature on lobbying, one can
observe that the majority of existing empirical
research either examines political interplay in the
regulatory domain and standard-setters’ level of
responsiveness to constituents’ suggestions (Hope
and Gray, 1982; Pong and Whittington, 1996; Jupe,
2000; Weetman, 2001; Kwok and Sharp, 2005) or
investigates motivation and characteristics of the
parties involved in lobbying (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978; McArthur, 1988; Larson,
1997; Ang et al. 2000; Georgiou, 2005).4 There
are a number of studies that do examine lobbying
behaviour of different groups of respondents but
cross-respondent group analysis is not the main
focus of those authors’ investigations (e.g. Hope
and Briggs, 1982; Hope and Gray, 1982; Nobes,
1992; Jupe, 2000; Larson and Brown, 2001).
In addition, we note that much of the existing
literature examines single EDs (e.g. Tutticci et al.,
1994; Jupe, 2000) or groups of unrelated EDs
(e.g. McArthur, 1988; Kenny and Larson, 1995;
Georgiou, 2004, 2005).5 Thus, a novelty of the
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2 These are: phase D of Conceptual Framework Project:
Reporting Entity, which deals with control criteria conceptually,
and Consolidation Project that aims to refine and apply these
criteria in the accounting standard context.
3 Our interpretation of terms such as ‘issue’ and ‘argument’ is
presented in the sections on hypotheses development and data
and methodology below. Briefly, an ‘argument’ is any line of
reasoning, criticism, or comment, whilst an ‘issue’ is any distinct
matter of relevance to an ED or matter contained in an EDwhich
is referred to by a respondent.
4 One study that undertakes a comprehensive analysis of the
strategies employed by different groups of respondents is that of
Tutticci et al. (1994). The paper analyses the length of
comments, the strength of stated positions, the nature of
arguments offered, and finally the number of issues commented
on by different groups of respondents.
5 There are few empirical studies that are exceptions to this
conclusion and which base their analysis on the selection of
proposals that together address the same issue. Exceptions are
the studies of international standard-setting by Guenther and
Hussein (1995) and Larson and Brown (2001), and the studies
of national standard-setting by for example Hope and Briggs
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present paper is that it analyses a set of proposals
that together address the same issue thereby allow-
ing the opportunity for richer insights into lobbying
behaviour.
The remainder of the paper is organised as
follows. Section 2 presents an overview of prior
literature on accounting standard-setting, while
Section 3 describes the political and regulatory
background relevant to the exposure drafts ana-
lysed. Section 4 discusses the theoretical framework
and hypotheses, and Section 5 describes the data
and methodology utilised to test these hypotheses.
Section 6 presents the results. The final section
provides conclusions.
2. Prior research
Accounting standard-setting, like every rule-mak-
ing process, must be viewed, at least partly, as a
political activity. This point has considerable sup-
port in both theoretical and empirical accounting
literatures that acknowledge the far reaching eco-
nomic and social consequences of accounting
standards (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Taylor
and Turley, 1986; Mines et al., 1997; Zeff, 2002;
Carter and Lynch, 2003; Masocha and Weetman,
2007; Rutherford, 2007). Lobbying activities are an
integral part of this political process and are defined
as efforts by individuals and organisations to
promote, influence or obstruct proposed standards
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1978; Weetman et al.,
1996; Georgiou, 2004, 2005; Broadbent and
Laughlin, 2005; Durocher et al., 2007). The
research we consider in this section relates primarily
but not exclusively to the UK, the US and Australia,
together with work on international accounting
standards. Each of these settings represents a
different institutional context, with varying political
interactions. Differences in regulatory background
may affect the applicability of research findings to
other contexts but while acknowledging this, we
stress that the empirical research reported by this
study focuses mainly on submission letters, an
element of the due process of accounting standard-
setting that is common across all the regulatory
contexts cited in the paper. We trust that this
commonality will assist in moderating the impact
on the analysis and results discussed in the paper of
differences in institutional settings and cultural
backgrounds of lobbyists and regulators.
Lobbying activities are difficult to investigate
due to the indeterminacy of their timing and because
many lobbying efforts are not directly observable
(Young, 1994; Weetman, 2001; Broadbent and
Laughlin, 2005). Lobbying can occur before
accounting issues are admitted to the formal
agendas of regulators and may occur before the
due process of standard-setting even starts. The
accounting standard-setting agenda can be manipu-
lated so that controversial issues do not pass a test of
appropriateness and so are not allowed onto the
agenda, staying as a covert conflict. Furthermore,
potentially controversial issues may be kept out of
the politics of accounting regulation altogether,
representing latent conflict (Sutton, 1984; Hussein
and Ketz, 1991; Young, 1994; Weetman, 2001;
Jones et al., 2004). Lobbying activities can take a
variety of forms through formal and informal
channels, such as discussions with members of
regulatory bodies, pressure through media reports
and campaigns, representations to regulatory bod-
ies, as well as written submissions to publicly
available EDs on accounting standards (Walker and
Robinson, 1993; Georgiou, 2004).
Despite acknowledging that lobbying can take a
variety of forms, some of which are not always
manifest, the accounting literature does not provide
a feasible methodology that fully analyses the
richness of lobbying activities. For example, lobby-
ing may occur through the provision of subsidised
information to a rule-making body or during
informal telephone conversations but neither of
these types of lobbying could feasibly be empiric-
ally tested. The form of lobbying which is most
visible (and hence most accessible for formal
analysis) is through written submissions from
interested parties on exposure drafts preceding the
publication of financial reporting standards. Thus,
the main body of empirical research examines this
form of lobbying. The work by Georgiou (2004),
examining different methods of lobbying and their
perceived effectiveness, suggests that comment
letters are likely to be a good proxy for at least the
direct lobbying activities to which a regulatory body
is subjected.
Two main themes can be identified in the
literature investigating lobbying within the account-
ing standards-setting process. One group of
researchers considers relationships of power within
the standard-setting process and examines regula-
tors’ interactions with parties involved in lobbying
(e.g. Hope and Gray, 1982; Pong and Whittington,
1996; Weetman, 2001; Kwok and Sharp, 2005). A
second group analyses the incentives to lobby and
their impact on lobbyists’ behaviour (e.g. Watts and
Zimmerman, 1978; McArthur, 1988; Weetman et
al., 1994; Hill et al. 2002). Standard-setting takes
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 02 ABR Stenka.3d Page 111 of 130
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analysis of the lobbying of different constituent groups.
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place in institutional and social contexts where
allocations of power are affected by cultural,
political and market forces (Young, 1994;
MacDonald and Richardson, 2004). The regulator,
in order to survive and maintain her/his position,
must establish and preserve legitimacy in the eyes
of the constituents6 (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986;
Young, 2003; Masocha and Weetman, 2007). This
provides some constituents with the scope to
recreate institutional relationships according to
their preferences, as described by empirical studies
of lobbying at national (Jupe, 2000; Weetman,
2001) and international levels (Kenny and Larson,
1993; Kwok and Sharp, 2005).
Research examining standard-setters’ respon-
siveness to constituents’ suggestions as expressed
in their comment letters presents contradictory
findings. Some researchers cite examples of suc-
cessful lobbying (Hope and Briggs, 1982; Hope and
Gray, 1982; Nobes, 1992; Pong and Whittington,
1996; Kwok and Sharp, 2005), while other studies
reveal evidence of the low impact of lobbyists’
submissions on the regulator (Brown, 1981; Mian
and Smith, 1990b; Saemann, 1999; Weetman,
2001).7 When successful lobbying is evidenced,
the corporate sector is the most frequently men-
tioned constituent group that appears to exert
influence (Hope and Briggs, 1982; Hope and
Gray, 1982; Nobes, 1992; Jupe, 2000; Ang et al.,
2000). Other authors indicate that regulatory bod-
ies, regardless of the degree of their responsiveness,
are most aligned to the views of users of financial
statements (Saemann, 1999; Weetman, 2001) even
if only ‘on the surface’ (Weetman, 2001: 105). Some
studies find no alignment between the behaviour of
regulators and the preferences of specific lobbying
groups (Hussein and Ketz, 1980; Coombes and
Stokes, 1985; Giner and Arce, 2004), and this is
interpreted as evidence of the independence of
standard-setters. Analysis of the structure of con-
stituent participation consistently reveals that pre-
parers of financial statements are the most active
lobbying group and that responses from users of
financial statements are infrequent by comparison
(Weetman et al., 1994, 1996; Ryan et al., 2000).
A second theme of research attempts to identify
incentives associated with the decision to lobby and
seeks to analyse the impact of such incentives on the
lobbying positions of constituents. These studies
are based on the assumption that since lobbying
activities involve real economic costs, a rational
individual or organisation will only lobby if the
benefits of the desired outcome, adjusted by the
probability that lobbying will lead to the desired
outcome, exceed these costs (Olson, 1965; Sutton,
1984; Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Lindahl,
1987). Such studies mostly consider lobbying
incentives for two categories of constituents, cor-
porate respondents and accounting firms.
Generally, the benefits of lobbying for corporate
respondents are seen to depend upon the potential
impact of the proposed regulations on their
expected future cash flows through political and
contracting costs (Watts and Zimmerman, 1986).
Firm size as a proxy for political costs has been
found to be the most important determinant of
lobbying behaviour (Watts and Zimmerman, 1978;
Larson, 1997; Ang et al., 2000; Georgiou, 2005).
This is followed by the debt/equity ratio (Dhaliwal,
1980; Deakin, 1989; Ndubizu et al., 1993) and
management compensation plans (El-Gazzar et al.,
1986; Deakin, 1989) as proxies for contracting
costs. The relevance of proposed rules or rule
changes to the particular economic setting of a
company has been offered as a proxy for compli-
ance costs. Research testing this proxy has found
evidence of its impact on managers’ lobbying
behaviour (Sutton, 1988; Mian and Smith, 1990b;
Larson, 1997; Hill et al., 2002).
Studies of the incentives of accounting firms have
revealed tendencies for firms to favour regulatory
proposals that enhance their audit opportunities
(Puro, 1984, 1985; Clarke et al., 1997; Saemann,
1999) and tendencies to lobby in a manner that
establishes and maintains their public credibility
(Booth and Cocks, 1990; Lee, 1993, 1995;
Saemann, 1999). An alternative approach, which
regards accounting firms’ wealth as a function of
their clients’ wealth, suggests that accounting firms
would lobby for rules that promote their clients’
economic interests (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981;
McKee, 1991; Meier et al., 1993; Owsen, 1998;
Georgiou, 2002).
Some researchers have examined the content of
submissions to analyse lobbying strategies
employed by respondents to discussion papers and
exposure drafts (Nobes, 1992; Tutticci et al., 1994;
Weetman et al., 1996; Jupe, 2000; Weetman, 2001).
In relation to the nature of arguments used,
respondents are found to use either conceptually-
based arguments that refer to accounting concepts
or principles, or economic consequences-based
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 02 ABR Stenka.3d Page 112 of 130
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comment incorporation into final standards may mean that a
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constituent preferences or simply ignores the comments
(Brown, 1981). Alternatively, the crucial issues may have
been already discussed in private before the consultation was
brought into the public domain (Weetman, 2001).
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arguments that refer to economic implications of
proposed regulatory changes. Additionally, some
studies reveal that respondents also use rationales
that combine both conceptually-based and eco-
nomic consequences-based arguments when justi-
fying their position (Tutticci et al., 1994; Jupe,
2000). With regard to the strength of respondents’
comments, lobbyists are found to express varying
degrees of agreement or disagreement, from full
support through support with minor or substantial
reservations, to a fundamental objection (Tutticci et
al., 1994).
Some studies suggest that lobbyists may present
positions that do not reflect their true beliefs if those
beliefs might be perceived as socially or politically
unacceptable. Jupe (2000: 346) argues that, in their
efforts to influence a regulator, respondents may
have implicitly considered economic consequences
but explicitly may have used self-referential argu-
ments that related to their own accounting practices.
In addition, Weetman et al. (1996: 75) suggest that
with lack of user participation in the standard-
setting process, preparers may be ready to advance
their opinions of users’ needs in order to enhance
the credibility of their own submissions. The
transparency of corporate submissions has also
been questionedby, for example,MacArthur (1988),
Tutticci et al. (1994), and Dechow et al. (1996).
3. Regulatory background
The present study, as indicated earlier, uses the
regulatory concept of control that determines the
scope of consolidation as its focus for the analysis
of lobbying activities. The main rationale of
consolidation is to aggregate results, assets and
liabilities of entities that despite having separate
legal identities can be considered a single economic
unit (Mumford, 1982; Nobes, 1987, 1993; see also:
ASB, 1999, ch. 2). Following this logic, the
question of which undertakings are to be consoli-
dated is tied to the concept of control: all entities
that are controlled by a company ought to be
consolidated in that company’s accounts (Nobes,
1987, 1993; see also: ASB, 1999, ch. 2). That said,
the development of regulation on control and
consolidation is complex and the regulatory space
has been correspondingly densely populated
(Nobes, 1993; Rutherford, 2007: 258–264). We
shall now briefly review this development to set the
regulatory background for the paper.
In the UK, group accounts have been prepared
since at least the 1920s but were not required by law
until the Companies Act 1947 (Wooldridge, 1981;
Edwards and Webb, 1984; Nobes and Parker, 1984;
Nobes, 1987, 1993). However, the Act did not
specify detailed rules and a parent company could
choose between several options in presenting its
group accounts (Companies Act 1947, s. 151(3)).
Following a long period of regulatory stability these
options were narrowed to the form of full consoli-
dation8 by SSAP 14 Group Accounts (ASC, 1978)
issued by the Accounting Standards Committee
(ASC) (Wooldridge, 1981: 22). Consolidation
became the only permissible form of group
accounts by statute rather later, through the
Companies Act 1989, which implemented the EU
Seventh Directive into UK company law
(Pennington, 1990; Wooldridge, 1991; Nobes,
1993). Prior to the Companies Act 1989 recognition
of control was mainly based on ownership of equity,
requiring a parent either: (a) to hold more than half
in nominal value of the subsidiary’s equity; or (b) be
a member of it and control the composition of its
board of directors (Wooldridge, 1981: 17). The
implementation of the EU Seventh Directive in
statutory provisions switched recognition criteria
from being based on legal rights (de jure) to those
based on effective (de facto) control. It is important
to note that lobbying with regard to the concept of
control occurred during the UK’s negotiations on
the EU Seventh Directive. Diggle and Nobes (1994)
have examined the lengthy process of shaping the
EU Seventh Directive9 and conclude that the
Seventh Directive evolved from its initial draft
based on German principles and practices into a
final form more Anglo-Saxon in content. The
changes arose in part from the substitution of UK
elements for German, as well as from the addition of
UK options to German rules (the final version of the
EU Seventh Directive contained a large number of
options available to EU Member States). These
changes Diggle and Nobes (1994) attribute to the
activities of a substantial coalition of both national
interests and professional accountancy opinion in
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8 Full consolidation refers here to the practice of combining
financial statements of all group undertakings on a line-by-line
basis (i.e. adding together corresponding items of assets,
liabilities, revenues and expenses), eliminating intergroup
balances and transactions, and providing for minority interests
in the controlled entities (Wooldridge, 1991: 63). Provisions of
the Companies Act 1947 allowed for alternative forms of group
accounting, if in the opinion of the directors, a better presen-
tation of the same or equivalent information, which could be
readily appreciated by members, could be achieved (Companies
Act 1947, s. 151(3)). See also: AISG (1973), Wilkins (1979),
Wooldridge (1981), and Nobes (1993).
9 A detailed chronology is given in Diggle and Nobes (1994)
but briefly, the Seventh Directive originated in a preliminary
draft prepared within the Commission in 1974 and was
published as a draft directive in 1976; a revised draft directive
was released in 1979 and after many years of discussion,
compromise and refinement, the final version of the directive
was approved in June 1983. See also Muchinski (1999).
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favour of the changes. Other macro-level lobbying
took place over the choice by the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) as to which of the many
options (Nobes 1990) within the final version of the
Seventh Directive were to be adopted in the Bill
leading to the Companies Act 1989,10 lobbying
which is important in itself as part of the wider
regulatory background but which is also relevant to
the lobbying by individual respondents on particu-
lar EDs.11
As a result of the implementation of the EU
Seventh Directive, SSAP 14 was no longer fully
consistent with legislation and needed to be
reviewed (Nobes, 1993). The review was under-
taken initially by the ASC which issued, in July
1990, ED 50 Consolidated Accounts (ASC, 1990b).
Shortly after the issue of ED 50, the ASC was
superseded by the Accounting Standards Board
(ASB). In December 1990 the ASB issued an
Interim Statement Consolidated Accounts (ASB,
1990a) which had immediate effect, to coincide
with the introduction of the accounting provisions
of the Companies Act 1989. At the time, the stated
intention of the ASB was to issue a Financial
Reporting Standard (FRS), dealing not only with
subsidiaries but also associates and joint ventures.
However, due to the complexity of the subject and
recognition of the pressing need to issue a standard
dealing with subsidiaries, in 1992 the ASB decided
to issue FRS 2 Accounting for Subsidiary
Undertakings (ASB, 1992) and left accounting for
associates and joint ventures for subsequent atten-
tion. In drafting FRS 2, the ASB considered
comments submitted on ED 50. FRS 2 (para. 14)
refers directly to the Companies Act 1989 (s. 285)
and lists conditions under which control can be
identified and therefore a subsidiary undertaking
recognised.
Identification of control for the purpose of
determining the scope of consolidation is also
dealt with in FRS 5 Reporting the Substance of
Transactions (ASB, 1994). The ability to exercise
control is not only confined to cases where another
entity is a subsidiary undertaking as defined in the
statute. It was recognised that reporting entities
might sometimes establish other undertakings by
arrangements that provided the first entity with
effective control, but where none of such arrange-
ments were covered by any of the legal tests for
control recognition (ED 49, ASC, 1990a, para. 58).
Such entities had been widely used for off-balance-
sheet financing schemes (Peasnell and Yaansah,
1988). As a remedy, the concept of quasi-subsidiary
was introduced.12 Instead of a list of tests, quasi-
subsidiaries were identified by direct application to
the definition of control itself. As the essence of
control is the ability to obtain benefits, in deciding
whether an entity was a quasi-subsidiary of another
enterprise, regard was to be given to those who
enjoyed benefits arising from its activities (FRS 5,
para. 32). Generally, where the commercial effect
for the reporting enterprise was no different from
what would result from having a subsidiary then the
vehicle was to be classified as a quasi-subsidiary
and, following the notion of reporting substance
over form, consolidated.
At the time of the release of the exposure drafts
preceding FRS 2 and FRS 5, the scope of consoli-
dation was one of the most pressing and controver-
sial issues in financial reporting in the UK (Peasnell
and Yaansah, 1988; Nobes, 1993; Rutherford, 2007:
258–264). The deregulatory thrust of UK govern-
mental policies in the 1980s encouraged the bank-
ing sector to lend in newer andmore ingenious ways
(Rutherford, 2007: 258). This, accompanied by
increasingly aggressive management of financial
institutions, and active and imaginative financial
engineering by companies, contributed to a rapid
increase in the use of off-balance-sheet finance in
the late 1980s (Rutherford, 2007: 258). Concern
with the implications of these developments for
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10 Thus, the DTI was lobbied behind the scenes to shift from
its earlier position of supporting the Companies Act 1985
approach to control. The debate about off-balance sheet
financing in the UK led the DTI to implement options that
would allow for widening the consolidation requirement and
restricting opportunities for off-balance-sheet finance schemes
(Brown, 1990; Nobes, 1990; and Pimm, 1990). The UK
Government’s stated intention was to bring off-balance-sheet
vehicles back within the scope of consolidation (Pimm, 1990:
88). See also: Wooldridge (1991), Nobes (1993), and Edwards
(1999).
11 For example, we may note in the context of footnote 12
below and of our results discussed later that those lobbying on
ED 49 would have been aware the DTI had changed its position
following the debate on the treatment of quasi-subsidiaries
during the development of ED 42, thereby informing directions
and strengths of lobbying.
12 The regulatory treatment of quasi-subsidiaries in off-
balance-sheet financing schemes commenced with Technical
Release (TR) 603, Off Balance Sheet Financing and Window
Dressing, issued by the Institute of Chartered Accountants in
England and Wales (ICAEW) in 1985, which recommended a
substance over form approach. The Technical Committee of the
ICAEW passed its work to the ASC and in May 1988 the ASC
issued ED 42 Accounting for Special Purpose Transactions
(ASC, 1988). The debate over ED 42 was ‘frozen’ pending the
passing of the Companies Bill (to become the Companies Act
1989) implementing the EU Seventh Directive with its radical
changes to the criteria of control. ED 49 Reflecting the
Substance of Transactions in Assets and Liabilities (ASC,
1990a), the successor to ED 42, was published by the ASC in
May 1990. After much debate the ASB issued FRED 4
Reporting the Substance of Transactions (ASB, 1993) in
February 1993 before in April 1994 publishing FRS 5 (ASB,
1994).
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banking regulation and financial institutional risk
management was initially expressed by the Bank of
England and soon this concern became more
widespread (Rutherford, 2007: 259). The increas-
ingly strident nature of public debate on off-
balance-sheet financing was punctuated by pro-
nouncements from the ASC and by suggestions for
future legislation from the DTI (Peasnell and
Yaansah, 1988). Despite general recognition that
there was a need to restrict opportunities for off-
balance-sheet finance schemes, substantial reserva-
tions with regard to ASC’s intentions to broaden the
regulatory interpretation and thus recognition of
control had been articulated by the legal profession
and reported to accountants.13 At the end of 1987
the DTI confirmed its intention to implement the EU
Seventh Directive in a way that would support the
consolidation of controlled non-subsidiaries, aiding
the ASC in widening the consolidation requirement
(Rutherford, 2007: 262). The pronouncements
included in the EDs were generally well received
but some concerns remained, articulated mainly by
accounting practitioners and academics. These
reservations referred to potential difficulties in the
practical implementation of the changes (Crichton,
1990; Holgate, 1990; Nobes, 1990; Thompson,
1994) as well as concern that a number of off-
balance-sheet finance schemes could still escape
consolidation (Brown 1990; Holgate, 1990; Pimm,
1990; Watson, 1996).
4. Hypotheses development
We seek to explore whether there are differences in
lobbying behaviour between corporate and non-
corporate categories of respondents to four related
exposure drafts.Analysis of consent or conflict over
the standard-setting process necessitates the group-
ing of interested parties in some way. A frequently
used taxonomy underpinning research into lobby-
ing can be linked to what Booth and Cocks (1990)
termed ‘historical blocs and the social relations of
production’. According to Booth and Cocks ‘in
presentWestern society it is widely agreed that there
are four such groups: corporate management (as a
branch of capital), the professions, and the state and
labour’ (1990: 518). Many studies of lobbying
reflect versions of this taxonomy in the context of
the accounting standard-setting process. Three main
constituent categories, with different variations, are
frequently identified, namely: (a) preparers of
financial statements represented mainly by corpor-
ations; (b) users of financial statements, comprising
investors, creditors and financial analysts; and (c)
the accounting profession, namely accounting firms
(Sutton, 1984; Tandy andWilburn, 1992; Tutticci et
al., 1994; Saemann, 1999).14
In order to analyse the lobbying behaviour of
categories of respondents one has to understand
their patterns of reasoning, how consent or conflict
is founded on these, and how they affect the
resolution of any such conflict. Modes of rationality
will determine respondents’ perceptions of how
accounting changes included in regulatory pro-
posals will affect their utility and thus their lobbying
behaviour (Sutton, 1984; Lindahl, 1987; Booth and
Cocks, 1990). Our division of respondents into
corporate and non-corporate categories is based on
the assumption that each group will have different
modes of rationality but the modes will be consist-
ent within each category. A dichotomous classifi-
cation is supported by Lindahl (1987: 60) who
distinguishes participants in lobbying into two main
categories: corporations and members of the
accounting profession.
The corporate category embraces preparers of
financial statements and includes both individual
companies and corporate representative bodies. It is
suggested that corporate representative organisa-
tions (industry trade associations) will lobby on
behalf of their constituents and tend to support the
majority of positions held by them (Brown and
Tarca, 2001). This positive association between
interests and lobbying positions of individual
companies and their representative bodies is a
consequence of companies being the parties that
constitute and fund these representative bodies.
Thus, it is assumed that representative bodies lobby
in order that their members’ preferences are better
promoted (Olson, 1965; Sutton, 1984; Lindahl,
1987). The non-corporate category mainly com-
prises respondents from the accounting profession,
accounting firms and professional accountancy
bodies. The notion of consistency of position
between member accountancy firms and their
representative bodies is supported by the empirical
work of Kenny and Larson (1993) and Saemann
(1999), who argue that not only trade but also
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13 The dispute between the ASC and the legal profession was
widely reported in the professional accountancy press, see:
‘Court battle looms over off-balance sheet standard’.
Accountancy Age, 9 April 1987: 1; ‘Off-balance sheet legal
doubts worsen’. Accountancy Age, 16 April 1987: 1; ‘ASC
stance could lead it into a legal quagmire’. Accountancy Age,
7 May 1987: 14; ‘Legal fun and games with the ASC’.
Accountancy Age, 30 July 1987: 13.
14 There are also some examples of studies that use different
taxonomies. For example, Hussein and Ketz (1980) and Puro
(1985) in their studies on elites in the FASB grouped the major
auditing firms together, while Laughlin and Puxty (1983) and
Weetman et al. (1996) divided standard-setting participants into
users and producers of financial statements.
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professional organisations lobby on behalf of their
constituents and tend to support the majority
positions held by those constituents. However, it
should be noted that professional accountancy
bodies will have multiple representative functions
(e.g. representing accountants as attestors as well as
preparers of accounts, and the pursuit of broader
professional aims). In our study the non-corporate
group also contains other types of respondents.15
Hence, the mode of rationality within the non-
corporate group may be less homogeneous than that
within the corporate group, and although the
strength of the assumption on consistency of
mode of rationality within groups is likely to be
greater for the corporate than the non-corporate
group, we posit broad consistency of mode of
rationality within each group as the following
discussion argues.
In order to explore the modes of rationality of the
corporate and non-corporate categories of respond-
ents, we refer to positive accounting theory which
argues that all parties to the process of accounting
standards-setting, act to maximise their own utility
and are innovative and creative in doing so (Watts
and Zimmerman, 1986). Thus respondents would
tend to lobby for accounting methods that further
their self-interest, e.g. reducing the cost or increas-
ing the benefits of regulations (Walker and
Robinson, 1993; Young, 1994; MacDonald and
Richardson, 2004).
With regard to the corporate category, proposed
regulations can affect companies’ wealth due to
their potential impact on expected future cash flows
through political and contracting costs. Thus cor-
porate respondents who lobby would tend to do so
to minimise their exposure to political and con-
tracting costs associated with proposed standards
(Watts and Zimmerman, 1986; Deakin, 1989;
Larson, 1997; Ang et al., 2000; Elbannan and
McKinley, 2006). In addition, the more relevant a
proposed change of regulation is to a company’s
business, the greater the company’s exposure to
economic effects caused by that change and the
greater the compliance costs. Therefore, we would
expect respondents (corporate as well as non-
corporate) to lobby so that they would minimise
their exposure to compliance costs, and to address
issues of direct relevance to their business context.
The mode of rationality of non-corporate
respondents, represented mainly by the account-
ancy profession, can be determined by reference to
several different theories, all of which are based on
the notion of self-interest. According to agency
theory, accountancy firms seeing their wealth as a
function of that of their clients, are likely to lobby
for rules that would promote their clients’ economic
interest (Watts and Zimmerman, 1981, 1986;
Sutton, 1984; Hendrickson, 1998; Georgiou,
2002, 2004). Alternatively, from the theory of
professional and legal responsibility, the account-
ancy profession has incentives to produce detailed,
erudite and conceptually sound submissions in
order to create the image of objectivity and
professionalism needed to maintain its credibility
in the public view (Hines, 1989; Zeff, 1984; Archer,
1992; Lee, 1993, 1995). This view may be applied
to both accountancy professional bodies and to
accounting firms since the latter are, as well as being
profit-making firms, members of a profession (both
as corporate bodies and collections of individual
professionals). The accountancy profession,
according to Booth and Cocks (1990: 519), has
historically been presented as a precise, accurate,
quantitative, and neutral purveyor of fact whose
primary responsibility is to the public. Following
this notion, the accountancy profession would
regard accounting primarily as ‘hard factual tech-
nology’ (Booth and Cocks, 1990: 519). The use of
judgment would be bound by criteria set out in
standards to facilitate the development of technical
accounting answers to problems of financial report-
ing and the measurement of wealth. Moreover, the
risk of litigation provides the accounting profession
with an economic incentive to follow a code of
professional ethics and consider issues of clarity,
certainty, and the appropriateness of financial
statements to audit (Saemann, 1999: 5).16
Additionally, accounting firms might respond to
submissions as a form of advertising, displaying
their expertise on a broad range of matters of
possible concern to existing and potential clients
(Lindahl, 1987). Finally, a third theoretical per-
spective is provided by the economic theory of
regulation, which suggests that the accounting
profession would promote accounting proposals
that bring additional disclosure requirements, since
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15 In addition to the accountancy profession the non-corpor-
ate group also includes some users of financial statements
(e.g. the Institute of Investment Management), academics, as
well as the Law Society, the International Stock Exchange, and
the Department of Trade and Industry, as a representative of
government, and regulatory authorities. However, whilst these
respondents add variety to the non-corporate group they are in a
very small minority.
16Many of the arguments in this paragraph derived from the
theory of professional and legal responsibility are applicable to
non-accounting members of the non-corporate group namely
the Institute of Investment Management, academics, the Law
Society, and the International Stock Exchange, thereby sup-
porting our position of broad consistency of rationality mode for
the group.
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that would enhance demand for their services (with
regard to both preparing and auditing financial
statements) and corresponding fees earned (Puro,
1984, 1985; Clarke et al., 1997; Saemann, 1999).17
4.1. Specific and general applicability of the
concept of control
In the light of the foregoing discussion and noting
our first research question on potential differences
in the nature of issues addressed by the two
categories of respondents, we hypothesise as
follows, in alternative form:
H1: Corporate respondents are more likely to
address issues of specific applicability of the
concept of control than are non-corporate
respondents.
H2: Non-corporate respondents are more likely to
address issues of general applicability of the
concept of control than are corporate respond-
ents.
The specification of our hypotheses introduces
matters of data and definition. Thus, for our analysis
an ‘issue’ is any matter of concern relevant to an ED
or matter contained in an ED referred to by a
respondent. Issues of specific applicability are taken
to cover matters of direct relevance to a respond-
ent’s particular line of business, or are specific to
certain types of business activity. They may also
refer to particular economic consequences insti-
gated by the proposals. Issues of general applic-
ability are taken to comprise matters of wide-
ranging relevance with broad implications that are
not specific to particular types of business activity.
They may refer to matters of theoretical or practical
soundness of concepts or wording used in pro-
posals, or the general technical feasibility of a
proposals’ implementation. Appendix I presents a
detailed list of the issues mentioned by corporate
and non-corporate respondents, classified as being
of either general or specific applicability to the
concept of control.
The extent of lobbyists’ attention given to issues
of specific or general applicability of the concept of
control is measured by the number of submission
letters that mention such issues (as reported in
Table 2), the frequency of respondents referring to
these issues (as reported in Table 3), as well as the
number of arguments and suggestions that address
those issues (as reported in Table 4). As an
‘argument’ we take any systematic line of reasoning
or criticism offered by respondents in support of
their view and as a ‘suggestion’ any proposal to
modify the terms of an ED. Issues relating to the
concept of control may contain single or multiple
arguments and/or suggestions, or may be expres-
sions of concern or interest without any argument or
suggestion. The use of multiple and layered proxies
for lobbyists’ attention (i.e. number of submission
letters, frequency with which issues are referred to,
and frequency of arguments and suggestions used
by respondents) permits a detailed examination of
respondents’ lobbying activity.
We argue that hypotheses H1 and H2 are
consistent with the theoretical frameworks of
Sutton (1984) and Lindahl (1987) and are supported
by the empirical work of Sutton (1988), Schallow
(1995), Larson (1997), Ang et al. (2000) and Hill et
al. (2002). The literature cited here suggests that the
relevance of proposed accounting rules or rule
changes to the particular economic setting of
respondents has an impact on their lobbying
behaviour. Consequently, we posit that corporate
respondents will comment on issues of specific
applicability of the concept of control to particular
industries or companies as these would be of direct
relevance to their business activities or their
economic context. Following the notion of utility
maximisation, it would be a waste of resources for a
corporate respondent to comment on general issues
without direct applicability to her/his specific
economic context.
The non-corporate respondent category is dom-
inated by accountancy firms and their professional
bodies. The former are concerned with supplying
accounting, auditing and professional advisory
services to varied business sectors and the latter
are faced with a similarly wide spectrum of diverse
accounting issues and interests. Therefore we posit
that non-corporate respondents would be more
likely to address issues of general applicability of
the concept of control as these are directly relevant
to their line of business and consistent with other
motivations of accountancy firms and their profes-
sional bodies. We note that consistent arguments
can be applied to the non-accounting professional
members of the non-corporate group.
4.2. Conceptual and economic arguments
Our second research question refers to potential
differences in the nature of arguments used by the
two respondent categories to support their pos-
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17 This positionmight also be a source of economic incentives
for the Law Society. An additional view from this theoretical
standing is an interest in sound regulation per se by the
accountancy profession qua custodian of professional standards.
The Institute of Investment Management, academics, the Law
Society, the International Stock Exchange, and the DTI can be
considered to share this latter view.
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itions; in relation to this question we hypothesise, in
alternative form:
H3: Conceptually-based arguments will tend to be
the most frequently used type of argument
in submissions by both corporate and non-
corporate respondents.
H4: Corporate respondents are more likely to use
arguments based on economic consequences
than are non-corporate respondents.
Hypotheses three and four require further
disaggregation of our data by distinguishing sub-
categories of arguments. Conceptually-based argu-
ments are taken to refer to accounting concepts and
principles as well as technical issues. Respondents
using such arguments would base their reasoning on
theoretical and conceptual soundness, as well as the
technical feasibility of the proposals. They would
also refer to potential institutional and legal com-
plications caused by the proposals if they were to be
in conflict (in the respondents’ view) with current
government policies or already existing regulations
and statutory provisions. Economic consequences-
based arguments are taken to refer to economic
changes associated with proposed accounting regu-
lations and the implications of those changes. Such
economic changes would have scope (as perceived
by respondents) to influence respondents’ utility
through the impact on their cash flows.
Additionally, we identify a third type of argument,
the combined argument, which refers jointly to both
economic consequences and conceptual consider-
ations. Typically, a lobbyist using a combined
argument might refer to the economic implications
of conceptual or technical flaws in proposed
regulations (Tutticci et al., 1994).
We argue that hypothesis H3 is consistent with
the general findings of the lobbying literature that
respondents, on the whole, are more likely to favour
conceptually-based arguments to support their
positions as they believe such arguments will be
more effective in influencing a regulator (Watts and
Zimmerman, 1979; Sutton, 1984; Walker and
Robinson, 1993; Tutticci et al., 1994; Weetman,
2001). According to Watts and Zimmerman (1979:
273) ‘ . . . regulation creates incentives for individ-
uals to lobby on proposed accounting procedures,
and accounting theories are useful justifications in
the political lobbying.’ Some respondents may be
reluctant to provide economic consequences-based
arguments as they might be seen as self-serving and
therefore less likely to be considered by a regulator
(Jupe, 2000: 346). For hypothesis H4 we draw on
positive accounting theory to argue that economic
consequences-based arguments, when used, are
more likely to be offered by corporate than non-
corporate respondents, since the former are more
directly exposed to the specific economic implica-
tions of proposed accounting changes than the latter
(Sutton, 1984; Lindahl, 1987). Moreover, we take
from the literature the suggestion that non-corporate
respondents might hesitate to use economic conse-
quences-based arguments as this would conflict
with the image of professionalism and objectivity
that the accountancy profession (and other profes-
sional bodies) favours (Zeff, 1984; Hines, 1989;
Booth and Cocks, 1990; Lee, 1993, 1995; Saemann,
1999). We observe that H3 and H4 are consistent in
that even if the majority of arguments made are
conceptually-based (because inter alia corporate
respondents may prefer to disguise economic
consequences rationales by using conceptually
based arguments), corporate respondents would be
still more likely to reveal at least some of their
economic consequences-based arguments.
5. Data and methodology
Our analysis is based on the four exposure drafts
that preceded the two accounting standards relevant
to the concept of control for consolidated accounts.
As indicated above, FRS 2 Accounting for
Subsidiary Undertakings (ASB, 1992) was pre-
ceded by ED 50 (ASC, 1990b), while FRS 5
Recording the Substance of Transactions (ASB,
1994) was published after the subsequent release of
three exposure drafts. These were: ED 42
Accounting for Special Purpose Transactions
(ASC, 1988); ED 49 Reflecting the Substance of
Transactions in Assets and Liabilities (ASC,
1990a); and finally FRED 4 Reporting the
Substance of Transactions (ASB, 1993). Sets of
comment letters on these exposure drafts were
supplied by the library of The Institute of Chartered
Accountants of Scotland.18
Table 1 reports the number of comment letters
submitted on the four exposure drafts by corporate
and non-corporate respondents. The letters were
analysed for references to the concept of control and
those that contained such references were selected
for further detailed analysis. Overall, from 194
written responses submitted to the ASC and the
ASB on the four EDs, 98 contained references to the
CCH - ABR Data Standards Ltd, Frome, Somerset – 13/5/2010 02 ABR Stenka.3d Page 118 of 130
18 The authors recognise that an exclusive focus on written
submissions captures only one of the varieties of actions
encompassed within lobbying. As a potential remedy, an
examination of materials from ASC and ASB archives was
conducted. However, analysis of these materials revealed that
records were incomplete and did not contain anything signifi-
cant for the empirical research reported in the study.
Consequently the paper focuses solely on written submissions
to the EDs.
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concept of control and these are the main focus of
the present study. Of these 98 submissions, 43 were
received from corporate respondents and 55 from
non-corporate lobbyists.
The written submissions were reviewed in detail,
applying content analysis, a method used widely in
social sciences to examine different kinds of
documentary accounts. Generally, content analysis
is a research technique used to draw inferences from
documents concerning sender(s) of the message
contained in the document, the message itself, or the
audience for the message (Bryman, 2001). In the
context of accounting research, content analysis has
been used to investigate financial information
communicated through written narratives included
in corporate annual reports (Aerts, 1994; Beattie
and Jones, 1992, 1997); accounting, finance, and
tax textbooks (Urbancic, 1993); official pronounce-
ments by accounting bodies (Hooks and Moon,
1993); and written records of tax and legal cases
(Taylor and Ingram, 1984). The lobbying literature
examining written submissions on EDs has utilised
a variety of forms of content analysis. In their
studies, authors have employed analysis of different
levels of detail and presented results ranging from
simply determining whether lobbyists agreed or
disagreed with proposals (e.g. Buckmaster and
Hall, 1990; Georgiou and Roberts, 2004; Georgiou,
2005) to reporting rationales behind lobbyists’
agreement or disagreement (e.g. Tutticci et al.,
1994; Weetman et al., 1996; Weetman, 2001; Hill et
al., 2002).
As noted above we use data at several levels of
aggregation. The highest level is the submission
letter (i.e. the entire letter submitted by a respond-
ent, as recorded in Table 1). After the most general
level examination of the number of comment letters
the analysis proceeds by disaggregating submission
letters by classifying the issues which they raise as
referring either to the general or specific applicabil-
ity of the concept of control. Within issues we next
identify separately arguments and suggestions
offered by the respondents. To test hypotheses H3,
and H4, arguments are further classified as being
either conceptual or economic consequences-based
or as a combination of the two (i.e. combined
arguments).
We note that, considering the four hypotheses
together, there are interrelationships within our
classification of the contents of responses in that
issues of general or specific applicability of the
concept of control can be addressed by any type of
argument (i.e. conceptual, economic consequences-
based or combined). The detailed review of the
submissions was undertaken independently by the
two researchers and classifications were compared.
Where differences in classification arose, these
differences were compared and resolved by discus-
sion. The data presented in the paper, and used to
test our hypotheses, are the outcome of the agreed
classifications.
In order to test our hypotheses we first present
descriptive statistics based on frequency and pro-
portions. Subsequently, we apply analysis of vari-
ance (ANOVA) techniques and univariate
regression analysis to investigate the significance
of the observed systematic differences in lobbying
behaviour between the two categories of respond-
ents.
6. Results
Hypotheses H1 and H2 relate to the relative
likelihoods of corporate and non-corporate lobbyists
commenting on issues of specific or general applic-
ability in relation to the proposals in the EDs that
refer to the concept of control. Tables 2, 3 and 4
report the data relevant to these hypotheses. Table 2
shows that consistently greater proportions of cor-
porate respondents’ submission letters to all four
EDs address issues of specific applicability rather
than issues of general applicability to the concept of
control. The proportions are reversed for non-
corporate respondents, again across all four EDs,
and show greater emphasis on general applicability
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Table 1
Numbers of submission letters on all four exposure drafts
Exposure
draft
Number of submission letters on all
aspects of the EDs
Number of submission letters with one or
more reference to the concept of control
Corporate
submissions
Non-corporate
submissions Total
Corporate
submissions
Non-corporate
submissions Total
ED 50 20 22 42 7 21 28
ED 42 27 29 56 12 8 20
ED 49 17 19 36 12 16 28
FRED 4 34 26 60 12 10 22
All four EDs 98 96 194 43 55 98
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of the concept of control. This is apparent within
respondent categories as well as between them.19
Hence we conclude that the results reported in
Table 2 are consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2.
Table 3 reports the frequencies of referring to the
issues of general and specific aspects of the concept
of control across all four EDs by corporate and non-
corporate category of respondents.
Table 3 shows that for three of the four EDs,
frequencies and proportions of corporate respond-
ents referring to issues of specific applicability of
the concept of control are greater than to the issues
of general applicability of it (with ED 50 being an
exception). For non-corporate respondents the fre-
quencies and proportions of mentioning issues of
general applicability dominate those of specific
applicability for all EDs. Overall, taking into
consideration all four EDs, over 70% of references
from corporate respondents relate to issues of
specific applicability of the concept of control and
over 82% of total references from non-corporate
respondents relate to issues of general applicability
of this concept. ANOVA of issues reveals, on
average, a significant effect (F=56.54) of the type of
respondent (i.e. corporate versus non-corporate) on
the subject of issues (i.e. specific versus general
applicability). This is statistically significant at the
1% level. Additionally, estimates from regression
analysis confirm a significant effect of the type of
respondent on the subject of issues which is
statistically significant at the 1% level. These results
are consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2.
Detailed examination of issues (see: Appendix I)
indicates that the specific comments of corporate
respondents were related mainly to special purpose
financial vehicles (such as financial limited part-
nerships, credit-granting entities, mortgage secur-
itisation vehicles and pension funds). Respondents
expressed concern that if these financial vehicles
were to be covered by the proposed regulatory
definition of a subsidiary or a quasi-subsidiary, they
might be ‘unnecessarily’ or ‘unfairly’ required to be
consolidated by the originating or funding com-
pany. In contrast, non-corporate respondents
addressed issues in relation to general interpretation
of definitions and concepts included in the pro-
posals. Their comments referred, for example, to
discussion of the meaning of the term ‘dominant
influence’, ‘participating interest’ or ‘management
on a unified basis’. Also included in their comments
were conceptual deliberations on definitions of
control and controlled non-subsidiaries.
Table 4 reports the attention given to issues of
specific and general applicability of the concept of
control by corporate and non-corporate respondents
as measured by frequencies and proportions of
arguments and suggestions.
From Table 4 we note that across all four EDs
corporate respondents consistently exhibit greater
frequencies and proportions of arguments and
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Table 2
Analysis of submissions addressing issues of general versus specific applicability of the concept of
control
Exposure draft
Submissions ED 50 ED 42 ED 49 FRED 4 All four Eds
Corporate respondents (number of submissions) 7.0 12.0 12.0 12.0 43.0
Submissions on general applicability
Frequency 3.0 4.0 4.0 2.0 13.0
Proportions (%) 42.8 33.3 33.3 16.6 30.2
Submissions on specific applicability
Frequency 4.0 11.0 8.0 10.0 33.0
Proportions (%) 57.1 91.7 66.7 83.3 76.7
Non-corporate respondents (number of submissions) 21.0 8.0 16.0 10.0 55.0
Submissions on general applicability
Frequency 21.0 8.0 16.0 8.0 53.0
Proportions (%) 100.0 100.0 100.0 80.0 96.3
Submissions on specific applicability
Frequency 4.0 2.0 5.0 5.0 16.0
Proportions (%) 19.0 25.0 31.2 50.0 29.0
19 It should be noted that lobbyists could refer in their
submissions to issues of specific and general applicability
simultaneously. Hence, frequencies and proportions reported in
Table 2 are not necessarily additive.
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suggestions on control issues that have a specific
applicability rather than a general applicability. In
contrast, non-corporate respondents exhibit greater
frequencies and proportions of arguments and
suggestions on the issues of a general applicability
of the concept of control. At the aggregate level, for
all EDs together, over 82% of arguments and nearly
70% of suggestions offered by corporate respond-
ents refer to issues of specific applicability of the
concept of control. The proportions are reversed for
non-corporate respondents with 72% of arguments
and 74% of suggestions relating to issues of the
general applicability of the concept. ANOVA
reveals, on average, a significant effect (F=51.96
for arguments and F=15.61 for suggestions) of the
type of respondent (i.e. corporate versus non-
corporate) on the nature of arguments and sugges-
tions provided (i.e. referring to issues of specific
versus general applicability). Results from regres-
sion analysis also indicate a significant effect (at the
1% level) of the type of respondent on the nature of
arguments and suggestions offered. These results
are consistent with hypotheses H1 and H2.
In passing we may observe that submission
letters tended to be focused strongly on multiple
issues within the broad scope of control. Across all
four EDs only eight submissions were single-issue
letters (two on each ED). Amongst the eight there
was only one case of a non-corporate respondent
commenting on a single matter (to ED 50). We also
note that, of the seven corporate respondents
submitting a one-issue comment, in each case the
issue commented on had a direct relevance to the
line of business of the respondent. It is interesting to
observe that generally the close association between
issues commented on and corporate respondents’
business activities (and thus possible self-serving
motivation and self-referential nature of comments)
was not disguised by respondents.20 For example,
in the submission by Lazard Brothers & Co. on ED
50, comments referred to the potential distortion of
group accounts caused by the proposed regulatory
changes. To illustrate and support its views, Lazard
Brothers & Co. enclosed a copy of its own
organisational structure and a pro forma balance
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20 This aspect of evidence on lobbying poses particular
problems of interpretation. There are references in the literature
to self-serving motivations in discussing self-referential com-
ments (see for example Jupe, 2000) and whilst such a
description may be a reasonable interpretation it may also be
pejorative and not accurately reflective of corporate lobbying
behaviour since companies may be pointing out real defects in
drafts of standards by using the most obviously available
examples available to them, those drawn from their own
experience.
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sheet of its own financial limited partnerships, and
expressed its concern as follows:
‘We seek to preserve the status quo: that is, that
client funds are not included in our balance sheet
or consolidated within our group accounts . . . It
would be misleading to our customers and
banking depositors to show client investments
in our balance sheet . . . It would also distort our
gearing ratios. Clearly it would also be damaging
if these client assets (and liabilities) were con-
solidated into our banking control ratios moni-
tored by the Bank of England . . . The other
regulator concerned – in our case, Investment
Management Regulatory Organisation (IMRO) –
looks on these investments as client assets.’
(Lazard Brothers & Co. Ltd. ASB, 1990b: 156–
157)
This tendency is apparent in other submissions.
The Commonwealth Development Corporation
(CDC), in its submission opposing consolidation
of foreign joint ventures, openly used a self-
referential approach, enclosing its financial reports
with its comment letter, with its spokesperson
stating:
‘I enclose a copy of CDC’s Annual Report since it
is necessary to understand a little of what we are
to appreciate the problems which I see in
applying some of the provisions of the draft. A
list of CDC’s subsidiaries and associate com-
panies appears on page 59 to 62 and our present
basis of consolidation is explained on page 38. If
we were to adopt a full consolidation basis we
would appear to be a multi-national conglomer-
ate, which we are not. Note 8 to our accounts
represent a consolidation of all our ‘non group’
subsidiaries; you will see they are a pretty mixed
bag. At present we consider we can continue with
this form of accounting which is the only
meaningful way in which we can report. You
will see from the list of associates we are
50% shareholders in a number of companies.
But are these companies under our ‘‘dominant
influence?’’ (Commonwealth Development
Corporation. ASB, 1990b: 189–190)
Hypotheses H3 and H4 refer to relative patterns
of use of different types of arguments by lobbyists
(i.e. arguments based on conceptual grounds,
economic consequences, or a combination of
both). Table 5 reports frequencies and proportions
of usage of each type of argument by corporate and
non-corporate respondents. We note that all
respondents considered together generally used
conceptually-based arguments. Of the 131 argu-
ments presented across all four EDs, 111 (85%)
referred to conceptual considerations; only 6 (5%)
were solely related to economic consequences; and
14 arguments (11%) combined conceptual and
economic consequences-based justifications. Thus
the data presented in Table 5 is consistent with
hypothesis H3 which states that both corporate and
non-corporate respondents would tend to use con-
ceptually based arguments most often.
As Table 5 further shows, economic conse-
quences-based arguments, when used, come solely
from the corporate category of respondents. In all
cases these arguments expressed concern with a
potential distortion caused by the consolidation of
special purpose financial vehicles (if recognised as
subsidiaries or quasi-subsidiaries) on gearing and
banking capital control ratios of originating or
funding entities. These arguments were all received
from corporate respondents representing the finan-
cial services sector. ANOVA shows, on average, a
significant effect (F=8.86) of type of respondent
on the incidence of economic consequences-based
arguments, significant at the 5% level. Additionally,
estimates from regression analysis suggest an effect
of type of a respondent on the incidence of
providing economic consequences-based argu-
ments which is significant at the 10% level. These
results are consistent with hypothesis H4.
7. Conclusions
The paper reports the results of detailed compara-
tive analysis of the lobbying behaviour of two
distinctive categories of respondents to four related
EDs. These EDs were relevant to the regulatory
concept of control used to determine the scope of
consolidation in the UK prior to the implementation
of IFRS. Whilst in the broad tradition of previous
studies of lobbying on accounting standards, our
research represents a contribution to the literature
by providing evidence of differences in the pattern
of lobbying behaviour between two different
categories of respondents – corporate and non-
corporate lobbyists. Moreover, the present study
examines together four related EDs directed at a
single area of regulation. In doing so it seeks to
address the complexity of lobbyists’ submissions
rather than standard-setters’ responsiveness to sug-
gestions or the motivations of the parties involved in
lobbying, the latter two themes being already well-
represented in existing research. Complexity in
lobbying through comment letters is examined
using detailed content analysis of submissions,
distinguishing issues addressed and arguments used
by lobbyists. We classify issues as of specific or
general applicability to the concept of control and
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classify arguments by whether they are linked to
conceptual, economic consequences, or combined
concerns.
The results presented lend overall support to our
hypotheses. Corporate respondents were found to
devote much more attention to issues of specific
applicability of the concept of control, whereas non-
corporate respondents tended to devote more atten-
tion to general issues. Strong associations between
the issues raised by corporate respondents and their
line of business were revealed. These links were not
generally disguised by respondents. With regard to
the use of different types of arguments, both
categories of respondents were found, as hypothe-
sised, to advance conceptually-based arguments
most often in their submissions. However, when
economic consequences-based arguments were
used, they came consistently from the corporate
group.
In addition to the analytical and empirical
contributions noted above, the paper provides a
further contribution through its choice of subject
matter. The concept of control for consolidation has
been not only a past source of controversy in
financial reporting and regulation, but remains
controversial. Hence the subject of the paper
maintains its relevance to current regulatory activ-
ities. Two long-standing IASB projects relate to the
concept of control and confirm this as an unsettled
area of regulation. This further regulatory attention
may be necessary due to contemporary accounting
scandals involving special purpose entities and a
lack of clarity in current IFRS21 creating a pressing
need to produce a single unified international
standard (Paterson, 2003).
Thus the continuing regulatory relevance of
control for consolidation offers potential for further
research. In particular the two IASB projects
provide valuable opportunities for the examination
of lobbying activities during the projects them-
selves and on the resulting EDs.22 Analysis of
lobbying at the international level requires attention
to each of the non-national interest groups (which
may be domestic or pan-national), national interests
(e.g. of nation states as represented by govern-
ments), and international interests, and hence is
conducted in a richer institutional and political
context than purely domestic standard-setting. The
present study has focused on the domestic dimen-
sion of lobbying but, as the paper has noted,
significant international forces operated in conjunc-
tion with domestic lobbying during the period
covered by the research. Thus the EU Seventh
Directive provided a complicating backdrop to the
lobbying analysed in this paper. Cooper et al. (1996)
compared accounting rule-making in the context of
the implementation of EU directives to a game
played out both internationally and nationally
which involves interchange between the account-
ancy profession and the state, possibly involving
issues not directly arising from directives.23
Although some limited discussion of macro-level
lobbying has been offered in the paper, we note that
our decision not to consider in detail the full
implications of such lobbying issues can be
considered a limitation. However, we argue that it
is one which we must accept, as addressing these
issues fully would extend the scope of the present
study too far. The limited data stored in ASC and
ASB archives provided major constraints to the
systematic conduct of such research but if investi-
gation brings into the public domain additional data
linked to such sources the analysis provided here
may be enriched further.
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21 As Hoogendoorn (2006: 25) comments: ‘IFRS is unclear
and unstable . . . [The] best illustration is the interpretation of
IAS 27 on consolidation. The IASB concluded that IAS 27
requires consolidation when de facto control exists. None of the
Big Four audit firms had reached that conclusion. Apparently,
IAS 27 is unclear.’
22 At the time of writing the ED on Phase D of Conceptual
Framework Project: Reporting Entity was estimated for the
release in the second half of 2009 while the ED on the
Consolidation Project was to be published at the beginning of
2009.
23 Inter alia Cooper et al. (1996) examine UK reaction to and
lobbying against the independence provisions of the draft
Eighth Directive against the background of other political
processes occurring concurrently including shifting interrela-
tionships between the UK profession and government, suggest-
ing the existence of a multi-level process in the development of
international accounting regulations. See also: Evans and Nobes
(1998).
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Appendix I
Issues addressed by corporate and non-corporate respondents
Issues addressed
General applicability Frequency Specific applicability Frequency
ED 50
Corporate respondents
Dominant influence 3
1
1
Foreign joint ventures 2
1
1
Management on a unified basis Financial limited partnerships
Control contracts Credit granting entities
Non-corporate respondents
Definition of control 7
16
2
12
12
5
1
Financial limited partnerships 2
1
2
Dominant influence Funds under management
Participating interest Venture capital companies
Management on unified basis
Benefits of control
Economic dependence
Management contracts
ED 42
Corporate respondents
Definition of control/controlled 4 Securitised mortgage vehicles 9
2
1
non-subsidiary Pension funds
Associates and joint ventures
Non-corporate respondents
Definition of control/controlled 8 Securitised mortgage vehicles 1
1non-subsidiary Pension funds
ED 49
Corporate respondents
Definition of control/quasi-subsidiary 4 Securitised mortgage vehicles 7
1Factored debts
Non-corporate respondents
Definition of control/quasi-subsidiary 16 Securitised mortgage vehicles 5
FRED 4
Corporate respondents
Definition of control/quasi-subsidiary 2 Securitised asset vehicles
(mainly mortgages)
7
1
2
1
1
Pension funds
ESOPS
Consolidation of investee
companies by investment trust
entities
Sale/leaseback agreements
Non-corporate respondents
Definition of control/quasi-subsidiary 8 Pension funds 4
2
1
ESOPs
Sale/leaseback agreements
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